Citation. Gonzales v. Carhart, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1133, 546 U.S. 1169, 126 S. Ct. 1314, 164 L. Ed. 2d 46, 74 U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2006)
Brief Fact Summary. A federal statute was passed that bans so-called partial-birth abortions.Â Its constitutionality was challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The federal nationwide ban on so-called “partial-birth abortions” is constitutional.Â
Issue. Is the federal nationwide ban on so-called “partial-birth abortions” constitutional?
Held. (Kennedy, J.)Â Yes.Â The federal nationwide ban on so-called “partial-birth abortions” is constitutional.Â The 2003 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act avoids vagueness problems by spelling out “anatomical landmarks” on the fetal body and setting physician intent requirements that provide reasonable notice of the particular abortion procedures prohibited.Â The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate “that requiring doctos to intend dismemberment before delivery to an anatomical landmark will prohibit the vast majority of D&E abortions.”Â The statute does apply both previability and postviability because, by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether it is viable outside of the womb or not.Â But, under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 506 U.S. 833 (1992), which reaffirmed a woman’s right to choose an abortion previability, the issue in this facial challenge was whether the statute imposed a substantial obstacle to late-term, but previability abortions.Â Casey recognized the state’s interest “in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child.”Â That interest allows the state to restrict abortion methods that doctors might otherwise choose, “in order to promote respect for life.”Â The health exception recognized in Casey and Stenberg cannot be interpreted in a way to “set at naught” the government’s interest in fetal life.Â Here, there is “documented disagreement whether the Act’s prohibition would ever impose significant health risks on women.”Â When medical uncertainty is present, the Court defers to legislative choice.Â In addition, the mother’s health exception requirement cannot be interpreted to preclude regulation of abortion methods that further the government’s interest in protecting and respecting fetal life when there is only uncertainty in the medical community about whether a specific abortion method is ever medically necessary.Â In this case, Congress sought to promote respect for life by drawing a bright line between abortion and infanticide.Â The statute also recognizes “the bond of love the mother has for her child” by saving her from the sorrow of undergoing what she may not be told until later is a gruesome procedure.Â The Act is not invalid on its face.
Dissent. (Thomas, J.)Â The opinion “accurately applies” Casey and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), however those decisions, while “current jurisprudence,” have “no basis in the Constitution.”
Concurrence. (Ginsburg, J.)Â The reconstituted Court’s “alarming” decision disrespected precedent, gutted the long-standing health exception requirement, and showed an obvious “hostility” to abortion rights.Â The ruling “refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously.”Â It ignores district court findings that intact D&E is safer for women with certain conditions and generally offers safety advantages over standard D&E, instead siding with a statute that even the majority recognized contains factual errors.Â The Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.Â
Discussion. Do not forget that this decision answered a facial attack on the statute, leaving open the possibility that the statute, as applied, may not survive constitutional scrutiny.Â Medical uncertainty may reverse the direction of this case; if, for example, a partial-birth abortion became medically necessary to save the life of a woman, the statute may not withstand constitutional scrutiny.