Regarding the marital exemption, the equal protection clause does not prohibit a State from making classifications, provided the statute does not arbitrarily burden a particular group of individuals. When a statute draws a distinction based upon marital status, the classification must be reasonable and must be based upon some ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment. This Court finds no rational basis for distinguishing between marital and nonmarital rape.
Rationales for such a distinction are based either upon archaic notions about consent and property rights or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. An argument based upon supposed consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. A married woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman. Other traditional justifications that a woman was the property of her husband have long been rejected by this State. More recent rationales include that the exemption protects against governmental intrusion into marital privacy and promotes reconciliation of the spouses, and thus, elimination would be disruptive to marriages. There is no rational relation between allowing a husband to forcibly rape his wife and these interests. The right of privacy protects consensual acts, not violent sexual assaults. In such cases it is doubtful there is anything left to reconcile. Another rationale advanced is that marital rape would be difficult to prove an
d could lead to fabricated complaints by vindictive wives. The criminal justice system is presumed to be capable of handling false complaints. The final argument is that marital rape is not as serious an offense as other rape and can be thus dealt with by other criminal statutes. There is no evidence to support such a claim. Amongst recent decisions by other jurisdictions, only one court has concluded that a rational basis exists for the marital exemption. This Court holds that the exemption lacks a rational basis, and therefore violates the equal protection clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions.
Regarding the exemption under the rape statute for females, such an exemption must be substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. The People first argue that the exemption is appropriate because only females may become pregnant. However, there is no evidence that preventing pregnancy is a primary purpose of the statute. Rather it is intended to prevent unwanted forcible and often violent sexual intrusion. The People also claim justification is found because a female rape victim faces the probability of medical, sociological, and psychological problems unique to her gender. This argument is no more convincing than it was when it was advanced in support of the discrimination in the statutory rape laws. Finally, the People suggest a gender-neutral law for forcible rape is unnecessary because it is either impossible physiologically or an extremely rare case where a woman could rape a man. This claim is based on an assertion that sexual interco
urse is only possible if the male is sexually aroused, and if he is aroused he is consenting. However, sexual intercourse occurs after penetration, however slight. Such penetration can occur without arousal. As to the infrequency argument, numerical disparity itself cannot make the gender discrimination constitutional. This Court holds that the law violates equal protection because it exempts females from criminal liability for forcible rape. It is now the law of this State that any person who engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with any other person by forcible compulsion is guilty of either rape or sodomy. Because the statutes under which the defendant was convicted are not being stuck down, his conviction is affirmed.