Brief Fact Summary. Teachers brought suit under two state laws placing fixed cutoff dates for mandatory maternity leave and establishing set requirements prior to return.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires such rules must not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge upon the vital area of a teacher’s constitutional liberty.
Do the interests advanced in support of the School Boards Rules justify the particular procedures adopted?
Do the particular means chosen to achieve the School Boards’ objectives unduly infringe upon the teachers’ constitutional liberty?
Held. The School Boards’ rules requiring maternity leave at a specific date for all pregnant individuals is overly broad and violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Cleveland return rule is arbitrary and irrational, and therefore serves no legitimate state interest. The Chesterfield return rule serves a legitimate state purpose and is constitutional.
The School Boards provide two explanations for the firm cutoff mandatory maternity leave rules: they are necessary to maintain continuity of classroom instruction because it allows for the finding and hiring of qualified substitutes and because it protects the health of some teachers and unborn children who are physically incapable of performing some duties during later stages of pregnancy.
The first reason is not legitimate because the cutoff dates could be much later and still insure continuity, and continuity is sometimes worsened by the rule when teachers wish to finish a semester but are prevented by the firm cutoff dates. Thus they have no rational relationship to the valid state interest of preserving continuity of classroom instruction.
The rule sweeps too broadly to explain the second proffered reason because the ability to perform tasks during pregnancy is far more individualized. The Due Process Clause requires a more individualized determination, and administrative convenience alone is insufficient to justify the firm cutoff date.
The medical requirements and the requirement to not return to work until the next semester following birth are narrowly drawn and constitutional. The semester requirement serves the legitimate state interest of continuity in education. However the Cleveland rule requiring the mother to wait until the child reaches the age of three months prior to return is arbitrary and serves no reasonable objective.
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.View Full Point of Law