Brief Fact Summary. DeLawder (D) was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison for having sexual relations with a female under the age of 14. At trial, testimony of the girl’s prior sexual history was excluded. After judgment was affirmed on direct appeal, D sought post-conviction relief based on the argument that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment had been violated.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An accused person’s Constitutional right to confront a witness and seek out the truth takes weight over the claimant’s desirability to testify free from embarrassment and preservation of her reputation.
Issue. Were D’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment violated when he was prevented from exposing the jury to evidence relating to the claimant’s prior sexual history?
D was denied effective cross examination by being prevented from exposing the jurors to facts from which they could draw inferences regarding the witness’s reliability. The court rested its opinion on the Supreme Court’s recognition in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), that “the exposure of a witness’s motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination”.
The general rule is that because consent is not an issue in a “carnal knowledge” (statutory rape) case, the prosecutrix’s prior sexual history is immaterial with when offered as a defense. However, where the evidence is offered with regard to a witness’s reliability, an accused person’s Constitutional right to confront a witness and seek out the truth takes weight over the claimant’s desirability to testify free from embarrassment and preservation of her reputation.
The theory of the defense was that the witness might have made a hasty and faulty identification of the defendant in order to shift suspicion away from himself, or he might have been subject to undue pressure from the police and made his identifications under fear of possible probation revocation.View Full Point of Law