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Moore v. Phillips

Citation. 22 Ill.6 Kan. App. 2d 94, 627 P.2d 831 (Ct. App. 1981)
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Brief Fact Summary.

Leslie Brannan died owning land and a farmhouse, which he left to his wife a life estate, with the remainder interests to Dorothy Moore and Kent Reinhardt. During the lifetime of the life tenant the farmhouse was allowed to deteriorate and, upon the life tenant’s death, the remaindermen Moore and Kent filed suit against the estate of the life tenant for the waste of the farmhouse.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

A life tenant is considered by law to be a quasi-trustee for the benefit of the remaindermen and there is a duty imposed by law to neither commit waste to the property held in life tenancy nor to permit waste to occur.


In 1962 Leslie Brannan died owning real estate consisting of land and a farmhouse. By his will he left to his wife, Ada C. Brannan, a life estate in the land and farmhouse, with the remainder of the estate to Dorothy Moore and Kent Reinhart. Ada Brannan resided in the farmhouse until 1964. Thereafter, she rented the farmhouse until 1965, when it became vacant. From 1965 Ada Brannan rented the land, but the farmhouse remained unoccupied. From 1969 to 1971 the farmland was leased to the remaindermen but they did not occupy the house. The remaindermen inspected the premises from time to time through the years following. In 1973 Ada Brannan petitioned for voluntary conservatorship due to health problems. In 1976 Ada Brannan died testate, leaving her property to others. Ada Brannan and her daughter, remainderman Moore, were estranged from 1964 until Ada Brannan’s death. After Ada Brannan’s death, a demand for damages on the theory of waste was filed against the estate of Ada Brannan.

The total damages were alleged to be $16,159.00, but was found by the district court to be $10,433.00. The executrix of Ada Brannan’s estate, Ruby Phillips, asserted defenses of laches or estoppel, statute of limitation, and abandonment. The district magistrate sustained the defense of laches or estoppel, which upon appeal to the district court, was rejected as a defense and judgment was entered in favor of the remaindermen. Executrix appealed.


Are the claims raised by the remaindermen for waste filed eleven years after the creation of the life estate (and the death of the life tenant) barred by laches or estoppel?


No. Judgment of district court affirmed.
The Court first summarizes certain points of law which are necessary to the adjudication of the case. 1. A life tenant is considered to be a quasi-trustee of the estate for the remaindermen. 2. It is the life tenant’s duty to keep the property of the life estate in good repair. 3. Waste is a term describing neglect or misconduct, but does not refer to ordinary depreciation. 4. Waste is either voluntary or permissive (voluntary being an act of commission and permissive being an act of omission). 5. The remainderman may sue for waste in compensatory damages, for injunctive relief in equity, or for receivership. 6. A remainderman does not have to wait until the life tenant dies to bring his suit for damages from the waste caused by the life tenant. 7. Where the waste is characterized as permissive the injury is deemed to be continuing in nature and the statute of limitations does not run in favor of the life tenant until the end of the tenancy. 8. Laches or estoppel may, in certain cases, bar an action for waste.

Based on the evidence in this case the Court found that the defenses of laches or estoppel were properly rejected. The life tenant breached her duty to prevent waste to the property of the remaindermen. The preservation of the property was the chief duty of the life tenant.
The Court found that the majority of the waste occurred in the last two to three years of the life tenancy and that the remainderman Moore attempted to communicate her concerns about the deterioration of the property to the life tenant, who did nothing. Permissive waste to the property by the life tenant was proved in the lower court and as such was a continuing injury.
The Executrix (Defendant) could not defend the suit for damage resulting from waste to property held in life tenancy by Ada Brannan based on estoppel, which requires the defense to show prejudice resulting from the conduct of the delay in filing suit. No prejudice could be shown.


This case should be read closely because it provides a good illustration of key concepts of law and equity. The defenses of laches and estoppel are based on the theory that the delay in filing suit has caused the defense prejudice in their ability to defend the suit, and that it would be unfair to allow the suit to proceed.

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