Brief Fact Summary. This was a consolidated appeal of two separate cases in which indigent defendants were convicted in North Carolina trial courts. Both appealed and were represented by court appointed counsel before the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Each defendant thereafter pursued other discretionary post conviction remedies and were denied court appointed counsel.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The same concepts of fairness and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary appeals.
Held. Neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause require states to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in discretionary appeals or other post conviction relief.
The Supreme Court does not believe the Due Process Clause requires appointment of counsel for discretionary appeals because of the fundamental difference between a trial and an appeal. At a trial, the State’s purpose is to convert a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. At an appeal, it is the defendant who is trying to overturn a finding of guilt. Unfairness here will only result if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty. This issue is better considered under equal protection analysis.
The Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. It does require that the state appellate system be “free of unreasoned distinctions”. The question is one of degrees, not one of absolutes. The Supreme Court concludes that the Equal Protection Clause, when interpreted in the context of cases such as the instant case, does not require North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking discretionary appeal or other post conviction relief. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court analyzes the North Carolina statutes governing discretionary appeals and the function served by discretionary appeals in North Carolina. The Supreme Court concludes that just because a particular service might be of benefit to an indigent defendant, does not mean that the service is constitutionally required.