Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Arzon (Defendant), was charged with the murder of a fireman who had received fatal injuries when, responding to an arson that Defendant committed, he encountered a separate arson fire in the same building.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An individual is criminally liable for the death of another if his conduct is a sufficiently direct cause of death that could have been reasonably foreseen as a consequence of his actions.
In such and like cases, the imminently dangerous act, the extreme depravity of mind, and the regardlessness of human life, properly place the crime upon the same level as the taking of life by premeditated design.View Full Point of Law
Issue. Was Defendant criminally liable for the fireman’s death notwithstanding that the victim’s fatal injuries were received by an independent intervening cause not attributable to Defendant?
Held. Yes. Motion to Dismiss denied.
An intervening harm that is the ultimate cause of death does not excuse the defendant from culpability provided the defendant should have foreseen the harm as reasonably related to his actions. It was foreseeable by the defendant that firemen would respond to the arson he did commit, which would put them in danger of their lives. This arson fire, set by the defendant, was therefore an indispensable link in the chain of events that resulted in the death of a fireman. But for defendant’s arson, the victim would not have been placed in a particularly vulnerable location to be harmed by the separate and independent fire.
Discussion. This case stands for the principle that a defendant may be charged with murder even in situations where there is an intervening act that causes death. Provided defendant, as in this case, could reasonably have known that he was exposing another to life-threatening danger by his conduct, he may be held criminally responsible for other independent harms that befall the victim in the course of confronting the danger attributable to defendant.