Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs brought suit requesting an injunction requiring the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) to reinstate an initial interpretation of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). The initial interpretation applied the Act to actions taken in foreign nations. The Secretary claimed that the Plaintiffs lacked standing.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress cannot create standing when an injury in fact, a causal connection and redressability are not present.
Issue. Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Secretary’s interpretation of the ESA under either traditional rules of standing or the individual cause of action created within the ESA?
Held. No. Judgment reversed.
The case and controversy requirement of Article III creates three minimal elements in order to have standing. The plaintiff must have suffered (i) an “injury in fact”; (ii) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (iii) it must be likely that this injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
In this case, the Plaintiffs failed to establish injury in fact or redressability. Because of the limited effect of the ESA, it is too speculative to claim that not enforcing an injunction on the Secretary would result in an injury in fact to any of the Plaintiffs. Likewise, it is too speculative to assume that any redress by the courts would have substantial impact on threatened species outside of the United States.
The Plaintiff’s claim that they suffered a “procedural injury” established by a citizen-suit provision within the ESA is also without merit. To permit standing based on this Congressional Act would usurp the power of the Executive to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
One who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another to establish and protect his own right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid of some interest of his own is as much bound as he would be if he had been a party to the record.View Full Point of Law