Griswold v. Connecticut

Brief Fact Summary.

A Connecticut statute prohibited the use of contraceptives both by married and unmarried persons. The statute also prohibited anyone from helping couples obtain contraceptives. Griswold provided information as to the means of preventing conception and was fined as an accessory under the statute.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

The rights governed by the Due Process clause are those related to privacy. It is really the right people have to make decisions about highly personal matters. These rights derive indirectly from several Bill of Rights guarantees, which collectively create a “penumbra” or “zone” of privacy. Here, the person’s interest in using birth control is fundamental and the state cannot impair that interest without satisfying strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny says that if a state or federal regulation is impairing a fundamental right, the court strictly scrutinizes the regulation. The objective pursued by the state must be compelling, and the means chosen must be necessary (nothing that would be less restrictive is available).

Facts.

From November 1 to November 10, 1961, Griswold and Buxton operated a Planned Parenthood center in New Haven, Connecticut. They were arrested on November 10, 1961, for giving information, instruction and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. This violated Connecticut statute Section: 53-32 which stated that any person who uses any drug or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned. Section: 54-196 stated that any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense outlined in Section:53-32 may be prosecuted and punished as if he was the principal offender. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.

Issue.

Does the word “liberty” in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment apply special constitutional protection for privacy in birth control decisions which would require special justification for state infringements on those interests?

Held.

Yes. Reversed.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Meyer v. State of Nebraska, and other cases have consistently held that the Bill of rights includes not only the freedom of speech and press, but the right to distribute, to receive and to read. There is a freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach. Without these peripheral rights, the specific rights would be less secure. The specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations form those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees have created a zone of privacy. The First Amendment right of association, Third Amendment prohibition against quartering soldiers in any house during peacetime without the owner’s consent is another facet of privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination, and the Ninth Amendment, which provides “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” The right of privacy is no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved in the people.
This case concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. This law regulates the use of contraceptives. It does not forbid the manufacture or sale. To achieve their goals, the State has used a method that has the maximum destructive impact on the marriage relationship.
The rights governed by the Due Process clause are those related to privacy. It is really the right people have to make decisions about highly personal matters. These rights derive indirectly from several Bill of Rights guarantees, which collectively create a “penumbra” or “zone” of privacy. Here, the person’s interest in using birth control is fundamental and the state cannot impair that interest without satisfying strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny says that if a state or federal regulation is impairing a fundamental right, the court strictly scrutinizes the regulation. The objective pursued by the state must be compelling, and the means chosen must be necessary (nothing that would be less restrictive is available).

Dissent.

Justice Black and Stewart dissenting.
Justice Black wholly disagrees with the wisdom of the Connecticut law but finds it cannot be said to be unconstitutional just because of the evil qualities in it. Instead, he takes the strict constructionist view that the right of privacy is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. The Constitution is not so much a living document that it must change with the times. The Framers knew about the need for change and provided it by the process of Amendments. He would not rely on the Due Process clause or the Ninth Amendment or any mysterious and uncertain natural law concept as a reason to strike down the state law.
Justice Stewart stated that the Court is not here to hold whether the Connecticut law is unwise or even asinine. The Court is asked to hold that it violates the Constitution and it does not because there is no provision in the Constitution that would protect this right of privacy.
Concurrence. Justice Goldberg, Chief Justice, and Justice Brennan concurring. Justice Harlan and Justice White concurring in the judgment.
Justice Goldberg: The concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental and it is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights. It embraces the right of marital privacy.
Justice Goldberg continued: The Ninth Amendment would protect the privacy in a marriage because even though the right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution, the Ninth is there to say there are fundamental personal rights such as marriage privacy, which are protected from abridgement by the Government though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. The right of privacy in marriage is fundamental and basic which is retained by the people within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
J. Harlan: The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not touch this Connecticut statute unless the enactment is found to violate some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Implicit in the Court’s opinion is that the incorporation doctrine may be used to restrict the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause. This is as unacceptable as using this doctrine to impose the Bill of Rights on the States.
Justice White: The Connecticut law as applied to married couples deprives them of “liberty” without due process of law, as that concept is used in the Fourteenth Amendment.

Discussion.

In the past chapters the Court determined that the word “liberty” in the Due Process clause gave special protection to the liberty of contract (labor law restrictions). More recently the Court has derived from the word liberty a special constitutional protection for privacy, personal autonomy and some family relationships requiring special justifications for state infringements of those interests. In this way general constitutional phrases become limitations on the power of legislatures.
Privacy matters that are explicitly in the constitution are from the Fourth Amendment incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment against the states, which protects persons, places, and possessions against indiscriminate searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination.
There is no language in the constitution that talks about privacy, family life or personal autonomy. There are three cases that laid the groundwork for Griswold, which talked about the special constitutional protection for interests relating to personal autonomy and family relationships.
(1) Meyer v. Nebraska (1923): A schoolteacher taught German and English but the law said she could only teach English from first to eighth grade. The Court found that the liberty protected by the Due Process clause “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness of free men.”
(2) Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925): The Court upheld an injunction against a Oregon statute which required parents to send children between 8 and 16 to public school. This statute effectively shut down private schools and injured enrollment in military academies. The Court reinforced the doctrine of Meyer where the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control was fundamental to liberty.
(3) Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942): A statute providing for compulsory sterilization of criminals convicted two or more times of crimes of moral turpitude was held invalid under Equal Protection law because it made grand larceny a felony of moral turpitude while embezzlement was not. Justice Douglas said this law involved the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle far-reaching and devastating effects. It would cause irreparable injury and the person affected is forever deprived of a basic liberty. The Court used a strict scrutiny test.