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Marshall v. Lockhead

Citation. 245 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1952); writ of error refused n.r.e.
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Brief Fact Summary.

After a judgment against Marshall (Plaintiff) was entered and his land was sold to satisfy a debt, Plaintiff filed a suit in another district court to set the judgment aside, claiming that the first court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because it had failed to serve him with process.


A district court in Texas entered an order in May of 1945, authorizing the sale of Plaintiff’s land in order to satisfy unpaid taxes. Plaintiff did not enter an appearance in the action. After the land was sold, the tax debt was paid and the remainder of the proceeds was paid to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued in a different district court, seeking to set aside the judgment on the basis that the first court had lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he had never been served with process in that action. The second court refused to set aside the judgment. Plaintiff appealed.


Can a party against whom a default judgment was entered sue to overturn that judgment in another court by producing evidence that was not before the court in the first action that the judgment was entered without the party being served with process?


(Hale, J.) No. A court will not overturn a previous judgment based upon evidence that was not before the first court showing that the judgment was entered without the party being served with process. This approach protects property rights, even though the original judgment appears to have been void. It also advances public policy by preventing courts from examining evidence that was not in the record of the original proceeding. Finally, examining the issue on equity grounds, this result prevents Plaintiff from reversing a judgment that resulted in him obtaining, and keeping, monetary benefit. The trial court properly refused to overturn the original judgment. Affirmed.


The approach used in this case comes from Crawford v. McDonald, 33 S.W. 325 (Tex. 1948). This rule advances the public policy of finality in judgments. If a court allowed parties to present additional evidence after the entry of the judgment, it would run counter to the doctrine that objections to personal jurisdiction must be made in a timely manner or they are waived.

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