Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Shore (Respondent), brought a shareholder’s derivative suit against the Petitioner, Parklane Hosiery Co. (Petitioner) and sought to collaterally estop the Petitioner corporation from re-litigating factual issues that a prior Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) judgment had found it guilty of.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Trial court judges have broad discretion to allow application of offensive collateral estoppel in cases where the Plaintiff could not have easily joined in the earlier action and where it would not be unfair to the defendant to allow it.
Issue. Whether a litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment may use that judgment “offensively” to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding. Whether notwithstanding the law of collateral estoppel, the use of it in this case would violate Petitioner’s Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial.
Held. Yes. Trial courts should be given broad discretion to determine when the use of offensive collateral estoppel should be applied. There is no unfairness to the Petitioner in applying offensive collateral estoppel in this case. The Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims in the SEC lawsuit and the SEC judgment was not inconsistent with any previous decision. The Petitioner is collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of whether the proxy statements were materially false and misleading. No. The law of collateral estoppel forecloses the Petitioner from relitigating the factual issues and nothing in the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) dictates a different result, even though because of lack of mutuality, there would have been no collateral estoppel in 1791.
A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously guarded by the courts.View Full Point of Law
Discussion. The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel. In this case, however, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) noted that consolidation of a private action with one brought by the SEC without its consent was prohibited by statute, thereby, not making it easy for Respondent to have used offensive collateral estoppel in its rigid definition. In this case, the Supreme Court opined that the Petitioner was not harmed by Respondent’s attempted use of the doctrine and allowed its invocation. The Petitioner gave the Supreme Court no persuasive reason as to why the meaning of the Seventh Amendment should depend on whether or not mutuality of parties was present. A litigant who has lost because of adverse factual findings in an equity action is equally deprived of a jury trial whether he is estopped from relitigating the factual issues against the same party or a new party. In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving the Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, On March 9, 1967 Citation. 350 F.Supp. 757.(1974).
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendants, TWA, Inc and Tann Company (Defendants), were sued in multiple lawsuits stemming from a mid-air plane crash. In one case where Tann Company was cleared of any liability, Tann Company sought to invoke collateral estoppel as to any other cases where its negligence was to be litigated. This included lawsuits against nonparties to the litigation where Tann Company had not been found negligent
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Collateral estoppel may be applied against parties who were not in a previous litigation.
Issue. Whether the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel can be applied against a person who was not party to the prior action.
Held. Yes. The court concludes that no principle of fundamental fairness inherent in the concept of due process will be offended by the application of the doctrine against plaintiff Humphreys to bar the relitigation of the issue of the Tann Company’s liability for the mid-air disaster. In this Court’s opinion unfairness will result and the effective administration of justice will be retarded if plaintiff Humphreys is permitted to relitigate an issue, which has been fully and fairly adjudicated.
Discussion. It is important to note that this decision did not conform to the weight of standing authority and was later overturned by the Sixth Circuit citing the overcrowded dockets concern could not overcome the due process objections. The court came to its holding in the present case through the following reasoning. The Bernard Doctrine abandoned the requirement of strict mutuality and in the present case, two of the essential three elements for collateral estoppel were met: (i) A final judgment on the merits had been met and (ii) the question of Tann Company’s negligence had been fully litigated. The third element required privity of parties in the present case to those in the Downey case and Humphreys was not a party to the case. Naturally, it would follow that privity not met as to the parties. Thus, the Tann Company could not invoke collateral estoppel. However, the court found that it did not believe that the maxim that each man be afforded his day in court be so fixed so that it mandatorily apply where careful evaluation of the record has been found. The Court reasoned that no principles of fundamental fairness inherent in due process were offended by application of collateral estoppel as to Humphreys.