ProfessorBrittany L. Raposa
CaseCast™ – "What you need to know"
In addition, Defendants argued that they did not have the minimum contacts with Delaware required to establish jurisdiction under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Moreover, Defendants argued that the sequestration procedures were inconsistent with the Sniadach cases (see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969). The Court of Chancery found for Plaintiff and the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned that the Sniadach cases involved default judgments and not compelling a party to appear. This court furthered reasoned that sequestration procedures help to adjudicate claims of mismanagement against Delaware companies, and do not cause permanent deprivation of property to their shareholders. Defendants appealed.
Delaware law determines that it has jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants’ property is in Delaware; and not due to their status as corporate fiduciaries. First, the statute authorizing jurisdiction does not specifically apply to stockholder derivative actions. Moreover, Plaintiff’s inability to secure jurisdiction over seven of the defendants because they didn’t have property in Delaware shows that there is no necessary relationship between corporate fiduciaries and stockholders. In addition, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Delaware is a fair forum. Plaintiff must demonstrate more than the applicability of Delaware’s laws to the controversy to establish a basis for jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants have received benefits from Delaware laws only demonstrates that it would be appropriate for Delaware law to govern obligations between Defendant and stockholders. This argument does not require that Delaware be permitted to exercise jurisdiction, especially considering its lack of a long-arm statute.
Concurrence. Justice Stevens: The majority should not broadly eliminate in rem jurisdiction by stating that there is no personal jurisdiction if the only contact the defendant has with the forum state is property located in the state. There are other means of acquiring jurisdiction over local actions that may be unintentionally limited by this broad language.
Justice Brennan (concurring in part and dissenting in part): The Delaware sequestration statute embodies quasi in rem jurisdiction that is no longer valid. The parties did not make the minimum contacts test an issue so the court should not have decided this issue. There is no proper factual record for determining the level of contacts in this case. This is also a constitutional question, and this decision will reach to all the state statutes that permit quasi in rem action through sequestration of property. The general rule is that the forum state has jurisdiction over the directors and officers of a corporation chartered by the state in a shareholder derivative action. A state’s valid substantive interests are considerations in assessing the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction. Delaware has interests in preventing local corporations from being victims of foreign stockholders and in regulating its own corporations.
In addition, jurisdiction can be based on out-of-state activities that have foreseeable effects in the forum state. Delaware’s failure to express an interest in corporate fiduciaries does not pertain to the minimum contacts analysis. Furthermore, there was purposeful availment of the forum’s laws because the corporate officers entered business relationships with Greyhound’s stockholders pursuant to the laws of Delaware.