Brief Fact Summary. A hospital developed a policy in conjunction with law enforcement officials for dealing with pregnant drug addicts.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A policy that permits searches where the purpose served is “ultimately indistinguishable form the general interest in crime control” does not comport with the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure works no new Fourth Amendment wrong.View Full Point of Law
Issue. “[W]hether a state hospital’s performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient’s criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search if the patient had not consented to the procedure.”
Held. Yes. Using the “special needs” test, the court noted that “in this case . . . the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment.” Further, there policy did not “discuss different courses of medical treatment for either mother or infant.” The involvement of law-enforcement officials throughout the development of the policy showed that the ultimate interest was “crime control.”
Dissent. The dissenting justices felt that the Court was incorrect to focus on the reporting of test results by the hospital to the authorities as the “search.” Rather, the search was the taking of urine, which is not an “effect” for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Concurrence. J. Kennedy concurred in the result, noting the greater penal quality of the policy. However, he was concerned that the law enforcement aspect might negatively impact the legitimate medical purposes of drug testing.
Discussion. A benign motive “cannot justify a departure from Fourth Amendment protections, given the pervasive involvement of law enforcement with the development and application of the MUSC policy.”