Zablocki v. Redhail

Brief Fact Summary.

After being denied a marriage license because of his failure to comply with the Wisconsin statute, appellee challenged the statute as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.

Facts.

A Wisconsin statute provides that any Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment may not marry, within the State or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry. The statute specifies that court permission cannot be granted unless the marriage applicant submits proof of compliance with the support obligation and, in addition, demonstrates that the children covered by the support order are not then and are not likely to become public charges. Appellee Redhail is a Wisconsin resident who is unable to enter a lawful marriage in Wisconsin or elsewhere so long as he maintains the Wisconsin residency. When he was a minor and a high school student, a paternity action was brought against him, alleging that he was the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock. The court ordered adjudging appellee the father and ordering him to pay $109 per month as support for the child until she reached 18 years of age.

Issue.

Does the Wisconsin statute, that provides that any Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment may not marry, within the State or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry, violates the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held.

Yes, the Wisconsin statute that provides that any Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment may not marry, within the State or elsewhere, without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. This is because with regard to safeguarding the welfare of the out-of-custody children, appellant’s brief does not make clear the connection between the State’s interest and the statute’s requirements.

Concurrence.

Justice Powell

The Court’s opinion that a State may never condition the right to marry on satisfaction of existing support obligations is wrong because the State has alternative methods of compelling such payments. To the extent this restriction applies to persons who are able to make the required support payments but simply wish to shirt their moral or legal obligation, the Constitution interposes no bar to this additional collection mechanism. The public-charge provision is either futile or perverse insofar as it applies to childless couples, couples whose economic status will be improved by marriage and couples who are so poor.

Justice Stewart

T0 hold that the Wisconsin statute violates the Equal Protection clause seems to misconceive the meaning of that constitutional guarantee. The Wisconsin statute is unconstitutional because it exceeds the bounds of permissible state regulation of marriage, and invades the sphere of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution does not specifically mention freedom to marry, but it is settled that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause embraces more than those freedoms expressly enumerated in the Constitution.

Discussion.

When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. While the Court may accept that the appellant’s stated interests – the permission to marry proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the necessity of fulfilling his prior support obligations and the welfare of the out-of-custody children is protected – as legitimate and substantial, because the means selected by the State for achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry, the statute cannot be sustained. Moreover, appellant’s rationale cannot justify the statute’s broad infringement on the right to marry. The statute merely prevents the applicant from getting married, without delivering any money at all into the hands of the applicant’s prior children and regardless of the applicant’s ability or willingness to meet the statutory requirements, the State already has numerous other means for exacting compliance with support obligations.