Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney

Brief Fact Summary.

The Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute was challenged on the ground that it discriminates against women in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Under the statute, all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. The preference operates overwhelmingly to the advantage of males.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Classifications based upon gender must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives. Any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females in public employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Facts.

The Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute gave advantage to all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions by making them considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. The preference operates overwhelmingly to the advantage of males. The veterans’ hiring preference in Massachusetts, as in other states, has traditionally been justified as a measure designed to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil service occupations. It operates to benefit an overwhelmingly male class. When this litigation was commenced, over 98% of the veterans in Massachusetts were male and only 1.8% were female.

Issue.

Does the Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute, under which all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans, violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause?

Held.

No, the Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute, under which all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. While the law overtly prefers veterans, it does not purport to define a job-related characteristic. It confers a benefit upon a specifically described group. However, this legislative choice was legitimate.

Dissent.

Justice Marshall

Unlike tax abatement, educational subsidies, and special programs for needy veterans, the costs of which are distributed across the taxpaying public generally, the Massachusetts statute exacts a substantial price from a discrete group of individuals who have long been subject to employment discrimination. Women was particularly and wrongly discriminated and thus the statute violates the Constitution.

Discussion.

The appellee’s argument rests upon the presumption that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions. Discriminatory purpose, however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects on an identifiable group. However, nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts civil service. Moreover, veteran status is not uniquely male. Though few women benefit from this preference, the non-veteran class is not substantially all female. In fact, significant numbers of non-veterans are men, and all nonveterans are placed at a disadvantage.