Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Mahrenholz (Plaintiff) sought to quiet title deeded to Defendant School Board (Defendant) pursuant to fee simple. The lower court dismissed the action, and Plaintiff appeals.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Use of the word “only” in granting clause regarding a condition establishes that a grantor intended to create a fee simple determinable rather than a fee simple subject to condition.
A breach of the condition in such a case does not, of itself, determine the estate, but an entry, or some act equivalent thereto, is necessary to re-vest the estate, and bringing a suit in ejectment is equivalent to such re-entry.
View Full Point of LawIssue. Does use of the word “only” in a granting clause regarding a condition establishe that a grantor intended to create a fee simple determinable rather than a fee simple subject to condition?
Held. Yes. Use of the word “only” in a granting clause regarding a condition establishes that a grantor intended to create a fee simple determinable rather than a fee simple subject to condition. Resolution of this matter depends upon proper interpretation of the deed’s language. If Grantor had only a right of reentry for condition broken, then Grantor could not own the property until he had legally re-entered the land. If the possibility of reverter existed, then he owned the land as soon as it ceased to be used for school purposes. The grantor used the word “only.” Use of this word indicates that the grantor wanted the land to be used by the school district for school purposes only for as long as it was needed and no longer. This is an example of a grant that contains a limitation within the granting clause. It suggests a limited grant, rather than a full grant subject to condition, and thus both theoretically and linguistically, gives rise to a fee simple determinable.
Discussion. Pull out your property books.