A nonparty allegedly told Mincolla that Yonaty was gay or bisexual, and then Mincolla told a close family friend of Yonaty’s long-time girlfriend with the hope that Yonaty’s girlfriend would be told. Yonaty and his girlfriend thereafter broke up.
Statements falsely describing a person as lesbian, gay or bisexual do not constitute slander per se.
A nonparty allegedly told Mincolla that Yonaty was gay or bisexual, and then Mincolla told a close family friend of Yonaty’s long-time girlfriend with the hope that Yonaty’s girlfriend would be told.
Yonaty sued for slander, alleging that Mincolla’s statement led to Yonaty’s ultimate breakup with his girlfriend.
Do statements falsely describing a person as lesbian, gay or bisexual constitute slander per se?
Complaint and third-party complaint dismissed.
No, statements falsely describing a person as lesbian, gay or bisexual do not constitute slander per se.
When asserting a cause of action for slander, a plaintiff must generally allege special damages contemplating the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value. Liberman v. Gelstein. Because Yonaty did not allege special damages, his case may only proceed if the relevant statements constitute slander per se.
The four established exceptions to the rule of slander per se are:
Charging plaintiff with a serious crime;
That tend to injure another in his or her trade, business, or profession;
That plaintiff has a loathsome disease; or
Imputing unchastity to a woman.
The relevant precedent is inconsistent with current public policy and therefore should no longer be followed. Prior cases were incorrect to assume that identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or another sexual orientation is shameful or disgraceful. In New York, members of the LGTBQ+ community are supported by the Human Rights Law and the Marriage Equality Act. Therefore, because the complaint did not allege extreme or outrageous conduct or special damages to support a prima facie tort claim, it was properly dismissed.