Citation. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 147 L. Ed. 2d 24, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3768, 68 U.S.L.W. 4449, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,499, 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4354, 2000 Daily Journal DAR 5845, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3116, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 382 (U.S. June 5, 2000)
Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Webster Hubbell (the “defendant”), asserted his privilege against self incrimination when he was subpoenaed to produce documents. The government granted him immunity but then proceeded to use the documents to obtain an indictment against him from the Grand Jury.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The government may not make derivative use of the testimonial act inherent in the production of documents to obtain an indictment of the subpoenaed individual.
Held. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation from being compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence without first obtaining immunity under 18 U.S.C. Section:6002.
Concurrence. In analyzing the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“Constitution”) at the time of the founding, Justice Clarence Thomas (“J. Thomas”) found historical evidence for the proposition that the privilege against self incrimination applied to the production of all incriminating evidence, not just to the production of incriminating testimony, based on the old definition of a witness as someone who produced evidence, not just someone who testified in open court.
Discussion. Because the act of production carries with it a testimonial quality, in that the witness must attest to the fact that he has possession of the documents, and that they are accurate, and a complete response to the subpoena, a subsequent indictment would be using that testimony to produce additional evidence in violation of the use immunity granted under federal statute.