1. No, because Dorothy’s statement was not an offer, but rather a statement of her intention to contract in the future. An offer requires the present intention to enter into a contract; here, Dorothy did not intend to create in Wicked Witch the immediate power of acceptance. Therefore, no contract results.
3. Yes, probably. If a reasonable person in Oppenheimer’s position would have no reason to know of the value of the plutonium (or any other reason for thinking that Einstein was joking), then under the objective theory of contracts, Einstein’s offer would create an immediate power of acceptance in Oppenheimer. The fact that Einstein actually was joking is irrelevant; it’s the appearance of a valid offer that counts. If, however, Oppenheimer knew that Einstein had a very dry sense of humor, and realized at the time that Einstein was joking, there’d be no valid offer and thus no contract. (An “offer” which the offeree knows is made in jest is not a valid offer, regardless of what any other “reasonable person” might think.)
4. No. Mass-market advertisements are generally construed as invitations for offers, not offers themselves, because they do not contain sufficient words of commitment to sell.
5. Yes, because under these facts, Camelot’s offer was specific as to quantity (“one left”), price ($24), and the person to whom the offer was made (“first come”), and was, in general, worded as a commitment to enter into a deal on proposed terms. As such, it created an immediate power of acceptance in anyone who chose to purchase the sword under the terms advertised.
8. No. An offer can generally be accepted only by a person who knows of the offer and intends to accept. This rule applies to rewards. Charming didn’t know about the reward, so his actions of returning the slipper did not constitute a valid acceptance.
9. (A) Yes. This is a contract covered by Article 2 of the UCC (since it’s for the sale of goods). Under §2-207(1), the fact that an “expression of acceptance” “states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon” does not prevent that expression from operating as an acceptance, unless the expression is “expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.” Since Euphrates’ response didn’t indicate that Euphrates was unwilling to enter the deal if Fern wouldn’t agree to the overdue-invoices clause, the response was not “expressly made conditional on [Fern’s] assent” to the overdue-invoices clause, and that response therefore served as an acceptance.
(B) Yes. Unlike at common law, under the UCC terms in an acceptance that fail to match those in the offer can nonetheless become part of the contract in some circumstances. Under §2-207(2), if both parties are merchants, an “additional” term in the acceptance will become part of the contract unless either: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) the additional term “materially alters” the offer; or (c) the offeror gives notice of her objection to the additional term either before the acceptance, or within a reasonable time after the offeror receives notice of the additional term.
Here, Fern and Euphrates are both merchants. (Since we’re told that Fern has an antique shop, we know she’s in the business of dealing in the type of merchandise in question, i.e., antiques.) The facts make it clear that neither (a) nor (c) applies — Fern didn’t indicate in advance that Euphrates had to accept exactly on the offer’s terms, and she remained silent after she got notice of the new clause in the acceptance. As to (b), The overdue-invoices clause is probably not a material alteration to the contract, since: (i) it will apply only if Fern fails to do what she’s already promised she’d do (pay on time), and (ii) a charge for overdueness that’s of a size typical for the industry probably isn’t a material change to the overall agreement. Therefore, §2-207(2) says that the clause became part of the contract.