(A) No, because Toyco does not have minimum contacts with the state of Florida.
(B) Yes, because the Florida courts could constitutionally have taken jurisdiction over Toyco in a tort suit by Penny.
(C) No, because no Florida statute would have permitted the exercise of jurisdiction over Toyco.
(D) Yes, because Toyco’s president was personally served.
7. Ted worked for a messenger service owned by Dan. While Ted was driving a Dan-owned car on business in the District of Columbia, he hit and injured Peter, a pedestrian who resides in Delaware. Peter brought a diversity action against Dan in federal court for the District of Columbia, on a theory of respondeat superior. Personal service was properly made, pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(2), on Dan, a D.C. resident. Dan now wishes to implead Ted as a third-party defendant (since if Dan is held liable to Peter, Dan will be entitled under common-law principles to an indemnity from Ted, the actual cause of the accident). Ted is a resident of Virginia, and lives in Arlington, just a few miles from D.C. Dan caused a licensed process server to serve Ted personally at Ted’s home in Arlington. Assume that the District of Columbia has no long-arm statute allowing state-court jurisdiction over any defendant who cannot be physically found within District itself. Does the federal court for D.C. have personal jurisdiction over Dan’s third-party claim against Ted?
(A) Yes, because Ted was a third-party-defendant who was served within 100 miles of the federal courthouse.
(B) No, because there is no D.C. long-arm statute that would authorize state-court jurisdiction over Ted.
(C) Yes, because service was properly made on Dan within D.C., the state or district where the federal suit is pending.
(D) Yes, because Peter, Dan and Ted are all citizens of different states or districts.
8. Paolo is a resident of New Mexico. Dwight is a resident of either Arizona or Mexico (the parties disagree about which is the correct state of residence for Dwight). Paolo has sued Dwight in diversity in federal court for New Mexico, and made service on Dwight in Arizona in a manner that he believed to be authorized by the New Mexico long-arm statute. Dwight then filed a motion under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; this motion asserted that Paolo’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court considered and rejected Dwight’s motion. Dwight then made another motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b), claiming that: (1) venue was improper; and (2) the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, because Dwight and Paolo are both citizens of New Mexico. Paolo has asserted that Dwight has waived the right to assert either ground for dismissal. How should the court rule on Paolo’s claim of waiver?