Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corp.

Citation. 245 F.R.D. 539 (S.D. Ala. 2007)

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Citation245 F.R.D. 539 (S.D. Ala. 2007)

Brief Fact Summary.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, alleging that DDT from defendant‘s manufacturing plan contaminated individual properties. Plaintiffs sought class action status, but the trial court denied certification. Defendants moved to sever the plaintiffs‘ claims into five different trials. The case would involve a mix of common and individualized evidence. The same experts would testify for the plaintiffs at trial, but the experts all lived out of state.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Severing a multi-plaintiff lawsuit into individual trials is not warranted under the FRCP when: (1) a single trial would be more efficient than multiple trials, (2) the parties’ claims and defenses arise from the same transaction, and (3) any potential prejudice to the defendants can be averted by appropriate jury instructions.

Points of Law - Legal Principles in this Case for Law Students.

A jury is presumed to follow the instructions given to it by the district judge.

View Full Point of Law

Jessie Fisher, Arlean Reed, Barbara Byrd, Ronald McIntyre, and Sharon Greer (plaintiffs) sued current and former owners of Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corporation (Ciba) (defendants), alleging that DDT from Ciba’s plant contaminated their individual properties. The plaintiffs initially sought class status, but the court denied certification on the ground that common questions did not predominate over individualized ones, among others. Contending that a single trial would be inefficient and prejudicial to them, the defendants moved to sever the plaintiffs’ claims into five separate trials. The case involved a mix of common and individualized evidence. The same nine expert witnesses would likely be called to testify with respect to each of the plaintiffs’ claims, however, and the experts all lived out of state.

Issue.

Is severing a multi-plaintiff lawsuit into individual trials warranted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if: (1) a single trial will be more efficient than multiple trials, (2) the parties’ claims and defenses arise from the same transaction, and (3) any potential prejudice to the defendants can be averted by appropriate jury instructions?

Held.

No. Severing the plaintiffs’ case into five separate trials is not justified under the circumstances.

Discussion.

1.FRCP 20(b) permit trial courts, at their discretion, to split a multi-plaintiff lawsuit into separate trials if a single trial would cause delay or prejudice

2.In considering a motion to sever, relevant factors include:

1. whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence;
2. whether the claims present some (not all) common issues of fact or law;
3. the effect on judicial resources; and
4. to what extent the court’s grant or denial of the motion to sever would prejudice each side.

3. The term “transaction” is liberally construed to encompass a series of events that are logically related.

4. Here, the defendants’ arguments for severance are not persuasive.

1. First, the court found that the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same transaction, because all of their claims were logically related to the emanation of DDT.
2. Second, there is a fundamental core of legal issues and factual issues common to all of the plaintiffs’ claims. The denial of plaintiffs’ class certification does not prove that their claims lack commonality, because the standard for achieving certification is higher than the standard for joinder of plaintiffs’ claims. Because there is a fundamental core of issues common to all of the plaintiffs’ claims, it would not make sense or be efficient to require such issues to be heard repeatedly in 5 separate trials.
3. Third, the fact that the plaintiffs’ claims involve individualized evidence is insufficient to warrant severing the case. Nine expert witnesses, all of whom lived out of state, would likely be called to testify. Requiring those witnesses to return on five separate occasions would be inefficient and potentially cost-prohibitive. Essentially, severance would create a substantial burden upon the parties, and that outweighs the inefficiency of a single trial.
4. Fourth, with respect to potential prejudice to the defendants from a single trial—e.g., jury confusion or the possibility of stronger claims “taint[ing]” weaker ones—such concerns can be addressed through a carefully crafted jury instructions. For these reasons, severance is not warranted under the FRCP and defendants’ motion is denied.