Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff sued Defendant in federal court in Massachusetts based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff served Defendant by mail pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant moved to quash the summons on the grounds that the Massachusetts service statute applied and it required personal service in order to be effective.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. If the rule at issue is procedural and the federal rule is on point with the state rule, then the Federal Rule must be applied as long as it complies with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. Section: 2071 and the U.S. Constitution. If there is no federal rule on point, then the Erie doctrine should apply.
Issue. Should the District Court have applied Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1) instead of the state statute governing the method of process?
Held. Yes. Under Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945), whether the state or federal law is to be applied is not just whether the law is substantive or procedural, or whether it is outcome determinative, but whether it complies with the policies underlying the Erie doctrine. Rule 4(d)(1) is not prohibited by the Constitution. It is authorized by Article III and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The purpose of the Federal Rules is to create uniformity. The Erie doctrine and the extensions in York and Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 69 S.Ct. 1233, 93 L.Ed. 1520 (1949), were not meant to block the federal rules if they are “outcome determinative” or have “integral relations.” Congress created the Federal Rules to create uniformity in the federal court system. Service of process is not a substantive right intended to be enforced by the Erie decision because the method of service here only “altered the mode of enforcing state-created rights” rather than changing the actual rights. Concurrence. Justice Harlan: The Court should focus on whether the rule applies to a situation that is normally one left to state regulation.
Moreover, it is difficult to argue that permitting service of defendant's wife to take the place of in-hand service of defendant himself alters the mode of enforcement of state-created rights in a fashion sufficiently substantial to raise the sort of equal protection problems to which the Erie opinion alluded.View Full Point of Law