Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Lewellen was in a drunk driving accident and was taken to the hospital.  Doctors there performed only a cursory examination of him and did not properly review his x-rays and despite his complaints of great lower back pain, discharged him after one hour.  He was immediately taken to jail overnight where his condition worsened until a jail officer took pity on him and arranged for him to go back to the hospital.  Overnight a burst fracture in his spine damaged spinal nerves leaving him permanently neurologically disabled.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), federally-funded hospitals must meet two requirements:  (1) A hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists, and (2) If such a condition exists, the patient may not be discharged until he has received a stabilizing treatment.  EMTALA was passed to combat the problem of patient dumping (the practice of transferring or discharging indigent or non-insured patients while their emergency conditions worsen).

Facts.  Plaintiff Lewellen was in a serious drunk driving accident and was taken to the Defendant Schneck Medical Center emergency room.  Dr. John Reisert examined him and noted that he was complaining of lower back pain.  Reisert ordered x-rays of his lumbar and cervical spine to determine whether there was a facture.  The quality of the x-rays were poor and there was a dispute in the records whether the poor quality was because Lewellen was in significant pain and unable to turn on his side or whether he was being uncooperative.  Before the last of Lewellen’s x-rays had even printed off (and before the doctor had a chance to review them) and only an hour after coming to the hospital, Lewellen was discharged.  He insisted he was in great pain and should be treated, not discharged, but nevertheless he was told to leave.  Thereafter a police officer took him immediately to jail.  While in jail, he had a burst fracture in his spine that was damaging his spinal nerves.  Later that night, jail officer McPherson noticed Lewellen crying in pain and saw that he had urinated all over himself.  The McPherson called defendant’s emergency room where a nurse told him that someone had reviewed the x-ray and found an abnormality, but despite the abnormality, Lewellen should not come back to the hospital.  Upset with this response, McPherson implored the jail commander to get medical help for Lewellen.  This was done and an ambulance was called to pick him up.  Lewellen arrived back at Schneck hospital and a CT scan revealed that during the night in jail, a fragment of bone from the burst fracture had displaced and was impinging on his spinal column, resulting in permanent neurological defects.  Thereafter, he could not urinate or defecate on his own and suffered from sexual dysfunction.  Lewellen sued the hospital under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”).  Defendant moved for summary judgment.

Issue. Whether a jury could find that the hospital’s treatment and examination of Lewellen did not satisfy EMTALA’s “appropriate medical screening” requirement.

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Iseberg and defendants were in a partnership that eventually dissolved.  One of the partners, Mr. Slavin, lost his entire investment and told two partners that he wanted to harm Iseberg as a result.  A few years later, Slavin rang Iseberg’s doorbell and shot him four times when he answered the door.  The two partners had never warned Iseberg.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a special relationships exists between parties, and an unreasonable risk of harm arises within the scope of that relationship, an obligation may be imposed on the one to exercise reasonable care to protect the other from, or warn him about, such risk, if the risk is reasonably foreseeable, or to render aid when it is known that such aid is needed.

Facts. Slavin and Mr. Gross formed a business together called Vernonshire Auto Laundry (“VAL”).  They contacted Plaintiff Iseberg, a lawyer and real estate developer, who was in the process of acquiring land to develop into a strip mall.   Iseberg and one Mr. Frank started a corporation, LFD, in order to complete that transaction.  VAL and LFD formed a partnership with each company contributing funds to purchase the land.  A dispute arose among the partners and the partnership was dissolved, leaving VAL with sole ownership of the property.  Much time passed and because the property did not sell, Slavin lost his entire investment.  Slavin became mentally unbalanced and focused his anger on Iseberg.  Slavin told Gross several times that he wanted to harm Iseberg and then commit suicide.  Gross told Frank about these threats, but neither told Iseberg.  In early 2000, Slavin rang the doorbell at Iseberg’s home and shot him four times when he answered the door, killing him.

Issue. Whether Gross and Frank had a special relationship with Iseberg such that they had a duty to act reasonably to protect him from, or warn him of, Slavin’s attack.

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Mairs was driving a car drunk which held defendant passengers Swanson and Newell.  After Mairs hit a motorcyclist, the group left the scene of the accident and did not call for emergency assistance.  Swanson in fact dissuaded anyone from calling 911.  The victim, left lying in the road, was hit by another vehicle and died from injuries sustained in both accidents.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The mere knowledge of serious peril threatening death or great bodily harm to another, which an identified defendant might avoid with little inconvenience, creates a sufficient relation to impose a duty of action. 

Facts.  Defendants Mairs, Swanson and Newell were 18-year-olds drinking at a friend’s home.  They decided to leave with Mairs driving while it was raining and the road was wet.  Mairs lost control of the car, struck a motorcycle driven by Plaintiff Podias, and went over the guardrail.  Swanson saw Podias lying in the roadway and because he saw no movement and heard no sound, told Mairs and Newell that he thought Mairs had killed the cyclist.  Even though all three had cell phones, no one called for assistance.  Instead, Mairs called his girlfriend, Swanson placed 17 phone calls in the next one-and-a-half hours and Newell made 27 phone calls in the next two-and-a-half hours, but none of them emergency calls.  After ten minutes all three got back in the car and leave the scene.  Swanson instructed Mairs “not to bring up his name or involve him in what occurred”.  The three drove south for a short while until Mairs car broke down.  Mairs pulled over in the bushes and waited for his girlfriend to arrive, while Swanson and Newell ran off into the woods.  Meanwhile, a vehicle operated by Patricia Uribe ran over Podias, who died as a result of injuries sustained in both accidents.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Swanson and Newell and plaintiff appealed.

Issue.  Whether passenger defendants, whose actions did not result in the car accident, nevertheless had a duty to prevent bodily harm to the victim of the accident.

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs were injured Arizona mine workers who claimed that the negligence of federal mine inspectors brought about a serious accident at the mine.  The issue was whether Arizona law would impose liability upon a private person in circumstances similar to the federal mine inspectors.  If so, the plaintiffs would be permitted to proceed in their suit against the United States.  The federal district court dismissed the suit, finding that plaintiffs could not make this showing, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court vacation the Ninth Circuit judgment, remanding to the district court for a final disposition.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.  The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), authorizes private tort actions against the United States (in effect, the United States waives its sovereign immunity) under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the state where the act or omission occurred.

Facts.  Two injured mine workers sued the United States claiming that the negligence of federal mine inspectors helped bring about a serious accident at an Arizona mine.  The federal district court dismissed the lawsuit in part upon the ground that plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to show that Arizona law would impose liability upon a private person in similar circumstances.  The Ninth Circuit reversed this determination based on two premises, holding that (1) where “unique governmental functions” are at issue, the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) waives sovereign immunity and (2) federal mine inspections are such “unique governmental functions”.  The Ninth Circuit then held that Arizona law would make “state or municipal entities” liable under the circumstances alleged, hence the FTCA waived the United States’ sovereign immunity.  The United States Supreme Court vacated the Ninth’s Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case.

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant ADT installed and monitored a call button alarm in the home of plaintiff Spengler’s mother, which allowed her to activate it in distress prompting ADT to dispatch an ambulance.  In October 2005, ADT received an alarm from the mother, but due to an error in the address that ADT gave to the ambulance dispatchers, the ambulance was delayed 16 minutes.  By the time they got there it was too late and Barker died.  Spengler sued on both contract and tort theories but the tort theory was dismissed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.  Where an actor’s only violation is that of a broken promise to perform a contract, and there exists no independent duty outside the contract to perform, liability, if any, must rest solely upon the breach of the contract and a tort cause of action is not available.

Facts. In May 2004, Plaintiff Spengler signed a contract with Defendant ADT to install and monitor a security alarm at the home of his mother Veronica Barker.  The agreement included a call button alarm that Barker could activate when in distress, which he requested due to her cancer of the larynx leaving her unable to speak.  In October 2005, ADT received an alarm from Barker, but due to an error in the address that ADT gave to the ambulance dispatchers in response to the alarm, the ambulance was delayed 16 minutes.  By the time they got there, Barker’s heart rhythm was asystolic, she never regained consciousness, and died in the hospital.  Spengler sued ADT alleging that by providing an erroneous address to the dispatcher, ADT committed misfeasance subjecting it to tort liability.  The district court granted summary judgment for ADT on the tort claim, finding that ADT breached no duty independent of the contract.  The court also granted summary judgment to Spengler on the contract claim, finding that ADT breached the contract and limiting damages to the $500 amount stated in the contract.  Spengler appealed arguing that the court erred in finding the case sounded in contract instead of tort, and that the $500 limitation of liability clause was unconscionable and unenforceable.

Issue. Whether a breach of contract may also give rise to a tort claim where an actor’s duty to perform arises purely under the contract.

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Margaret and Kevin Vaughn’s children were taken from them by the state due to unsanitary conditions and inability to rear them properly.  Ruoff, their social worker, told them that if Margaret got sterilized to prevent future pregnancies it would increase her chances of getting her children back.  She had the operation, but the state nevertheless recommended termination of the Vaughn’s parental rights to their children.  The Vaughns sued Ruoff for violation of their fourteenth amendment rights and won summary judgment.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Qualified immunity from due process claims analysis asks two questions: (1) Was there a deprivation of a constitutional right, and if so, (2) Was the right clearly established at the time of the deprivation?  As for (1), before the State may deprive someone of a protected liberty interest, it must provide certain procedural protections such as notice and opportunity to be heard.  As for (2), to be a clearly established constitutional right, the right’s contours “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what she is doing violates that right.”

Facts. Plaintiffs Margaret and Kevin Vaughn are married with children and Margaret has been diagnosed as mildly retarded.  In August 1993 they gave birth to their first child, Leta.  In October 1993, the Missouri Division of Family Services (MDFS) took custody of Leta, finding that the Vaughns failed to maintain a sanitary home and could not demonstrate an ability to rear her properly.  In August 1994, Margaret gave birth to their second child Kevin Jr. but the MDFS took custody of him one week after his birth, again finding unsanitary home conditions and an inability to rear him properly.  The same day as Kevin Jr.’s birth, Ruoff, the MDFS social worker who was assigned to the Vaughn’s case, told Margaret that if she got her tubes tied she would have her kids back in two to three weeks.  Margaret agreed and her tubal ligation procedure occurred in October 1994.  However, in December 1994, MDFS informed the Vaughns that it would recommend termination of their parental rights to Leta and Kevin Jr.  They sued Ruoff for fourteenth amendment violations.  Ruoff argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity, a theory that was rejected by the trial court.  The Vaughns won summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed.

Issue. Whether depriving an individual of her interest in procreation and contraception violates fourteenth amendment due process rights such that qualified immunity is unavailable.

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff public safety officer was helping load medical waste onto a truck when the unoccupied truck started rolling towards a public street.  He ran to catch it, jumped in, then stopped it and claimed he was injured in the process.  He sued the Defendant truck company.  The Defendant contended that his claim was barred by the firefighter’s rule but they were unsuccessful in that argument as the court held South Carolina does not follow that rule.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The “firefighter’s rule”  is a common law doctrine still applied in some states that precludes a firefighter (and certain other public employees, including police officers and public safety officers) from recovering against a defendant whose negligence caused the firefighter or officer’s on-the-job injury. 

Facts. Plaintiff Minnich was employed by the Medical University of South Carolina as a public safety officer.  While working in this capacity, Plaintiff assisted in loading medical waste from the premises onto a tractor-trailer truck owned by Defendant Med-Waste, Inc.  Plaintiff noticed the unoccupied truck begin to roll forward, toward a public street.  Plaintiff ran to the truck, jumped inside, and stopped the truck.  In the course of this feat, Plaintiff alleged he suffered serious injuries proximately caused by Defendants’ employees and sued in federal court.  Defendants contended the Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the “firefighter’s rule”.  The federal district court certified a question to the South Carolina Supreme Court asking whether the firefighter’s rule barred a claim for injury to emergency professionals.  The South Carolina Supreme Court answered no.

Issue. Whether South Carolina adopts the firefighter’s rule, thus barring Plaintiff’s claim.

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff States underwent surgery for removal of an ovarian cyst.  In the course of the surgery, the anesthesiologist negligently hyperabducted her right arm beyond a 90-degree angle for an extended period of time resulting in injury to her.  She sued the hospital on a res ipsa loquitur theory and had to present expert testimony as direct evidence of negligence.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine of ancient origin which means “the thing speaks for itself.”  It derives from the understanding that according to common knowledge, some events ordinarily do not occur in the absence of negligence, and thus negligence may be inferred from the mere happening of an event.  Expert testimony is frequently necessary in a medical malpractice case brought on a res ipsa loquitur theory. 

Facts.  Plaintiff Kathleen States underwent surgery for removal of an ovarian cyst.  She believed that during the operation the anesthesiologist negligently hyperabducted her right arm beyond a 90-degree angle for an extended period of time, causing right thoracic outlet syndrome and reflex sympathetic dystrophy.  She sued the hospital.  At the close of discovery, Defendant Hospital moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no direct evidence that the plaintiff’s arm was hyperabducted during surgery.  Conceding the absence of direct evidence of negligence, Plaintiff opposed the motion, submitting expert medical opinion that her injuries would not have occurred in the absence of negligence.  Plaintiff claimed this testimony could be used by a jury in support of a res ipsa loquitur theory.  The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment and permitted plaintiff to rely on the expert medical opinion for a res ipsa theory.  A divided appellate division reversed, but the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court

Issue. Whether a jury can rely on expert medical opinion in the absence of direct evidence of negligence to support a res ipsa loquitur theory.

Brief Fact Summary. Sixteen-year-old Elizabeth Wakulich consumed an quart of Goldschlager alcohol after Michael and Brian Mraz offered her money as a prize to do it.  She went unconscious and started vomiting while unconscious.  The boys checked on her and moved her to the couch but refused to get medical assistance.  She died as a result and her parents sued.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. One who voluntarily undertakes to render services to another is liable for bodily harm caused by his failure to perform such services with due care or with such competence and skill as he possesses. 

Facts. Michael and Brian Mraz, 21 and 18 years old, provided a quart of Goldschlager alcohol to 16-year-old Elizabeth Wakulich and offered her money as a prize if she could drink the entire bottle without losing consciousness or vomiting.  After drinking the entire bottle, Elizabeth lost consciousness.  According to the complaint, the boys put her in the downstairs family room where they observed her vomiting profusely and making gurgling sounds.  They later checked on her and removed her vomit-soaked blouse and put a pillow under her head to prevent aspiration.  They did not seek medical attention and prevented others from calling 911 or seeking medical attention.  Later their father ordered she be removed from the home, so they took her to a friend’s home then to the hospital where she was pronounced dead.  The complaint was dismissed on the ground that Illinois case law eliminated liability of social hosts for providing alcohol.  Plaintiff, however, appealed on the ground that the complaint stated sufficient facts to establish a cause of action based on defendants’ failure to exercise due care after voluntarily undertaking to care for plaintiff’s decedent after she became unconscious.  The court of appeals agreed.

Issue. Whether defendants’ actions demonstrated a voluntary undertaking concerning decedent’s well-being such that they had a duty to exercise due care in the performance of that undertaking.

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Whisnant worked in a Naval commissary and was exposed to toxic mold in the meat department.  After becoming ill he sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligently failing to follow through on procedures designed to safeguard the health of employees.  The government moved to dismiss under the discretionary function exception.  The district court granted the motion but the appeals court reversed and remanded.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Courts apply a two-part test for determining the applicability of the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).  Courts must ask: (1) Whether the challenged action was a discretionary one—i.e., governed by mandatory statute, policy, or regulation.  If not, it is not excepted.  (2) Whether the challenged action is of the type Congress meant to protect—i.e., whether the action involves a decision susceptible to social, economic, or political policy analysis.  It is the government’s burden to demonstrate the applicability of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.

Facts. Plaintiff Whisnant worked for a company that provided seafood to the commissary of a Naval base.  The commissary is operated by a government agency, DeCA.  DeCA regulations require periodic safety inspections, but DeCA employees are allowed to decide how and when to conduct such safety inspections.  The base contracts out maintenance work to Johnson Controls, whose inspections showed that mold had accumulated in the meat department of the commissary.  Over the next three years, plaintiff among others allegedly became ill due to the toxic molds, resulting in the government closing the meat department.  He allegedly contracted pneumonia, headaches, cough, and other health problems and sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for negligence in allowing workers to come into contact with the mold despite known health hazards.  The government moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff’s suit was barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, which provides that the FTCA shall not apply to “any claim based upon the exercise of, or failure to exercise, a discretionary function.”  The district court granted the motion to dismiss.  The plaintiff appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Issue. Whether the discretionary function exception bars an FTCA action against the government in failing to follow through on safety procedures designed to safeguard the health of employees.