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Brief Fact Summary. Husband and wife bore twins as a result of in vitro fertilization, and frozen preembryos remained. On divorce, wife attempted to enforce a consent form allowing her to retain custody of the preembryos upon separation of the couple.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. As a matter of public policy, the court will not enforce an agreement that forces an individual to become a parent if such individual later reconsiders his or her decision.

Facts. Husband A.Z. and wife B.Z. were married in 1977. The couple experienced fertility problems, and turned to in vitro fertilization (IVF) sing wife’s ova and husband’s sperm. The wife conceived and gave birth to twin daughters in 1992. More preembryos were formed than necessary, and two vials of preembryos were frozen for possible future implantation. Prior to the separation of the couple, the wife had one of the remaining vials of preembryos thawed and implanted. No pregnancy resulted. Ultimately they divorced, and one vial containing 4 frozen embryos remained in storage. During the procedure, the clinic required egg and sperm donors to sign consent forms for relevant procedures. Each consent form explained the general nature of the procedure and outlined the freezing process. The forms also require the donor to decide the disposition of the frozen preembryos on certain listed contingencies, including separation. On the initial form filled out by the wife, the decision
was to return the embryos to the wife for implant if the couple became separated. Thereafter the couple underwent 6 additional egg retrievals and signed 6 additional consent forms. Each time the husband signed the form, the wife filled out the disposition and other information. Each provide for the embryos to be returned to her on separation. The probate judge concluded that while donors are generally free to agree as to the ultimate disposition of the embryos, the agreement was unenforceable due to a change in circumstances in the 4 years following the last signature, including the birth of the twins, the filing for divorce, and the wife’s seeking to thaw the preembryos for implantation. The judge found that the best solution was to balance the wife’s interest in procreation against the husband’s interest in avoiding procreation, and determined that the husband’s interest outweighed the wife’s and the permanent injunction should be granted in favor of the husband.

Issue. May the law compel an individual to become a parent over his or her contemporaneous objection?

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Brief Fact Summary. Luanne and John had an embryo genetically unrelated to either of them implanted in a surrogate. The couple separated, and John disclaimed any parental responsibility for the child.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a married couple consent to in vitro fertilization by unknown donors and subsequent implantation into a surrogate, the couple are the legal parents of the offspring.

Facts. Jaycee was born as a result of Luanne and John Buzzanca’s decision to have an embryo genetically unrelated to either of them implanted in a woman surrogate, who would carry and give birth to the child for them. After the pregnancy, Luanne and John split up, and the question arose as to who were Jaycee’s lawful parents. Luanne claimed she and her erstwhile husband where the lawful parents, but John disclaimed any responsibility, financial or otherwise. The woman who gave birth made no claim to the child. The trial court determined that Jaycee had no lawful parents.

Issue. Did the trial court err in its determination that Jaycee had no lawful parents?

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Brief Fact Summary. The Sterns entered into a surrogacy contract with the Whiteheads whereby Mrs. Whitehead would bear the child of Mr. Stern through artificial insemination and relinquish custody of the child to the Sterns upon birth. Once the child was born Mrs. Whitehead found herself unable to part with the child, and sought to retain custody.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The surrogacy contract is unenforceable due to violation of both statutory law and public policy. Custody must be determined based upon the best interests of the child.

Facts. In 1985 William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead entered into a surrogacy contract stating that Stern’s wife, Elizabeth, was infertile, that they wanted a child, and Mrs. Whitehead was willing to provide that child as mother with Mr. Stern as father. Through artificial insemination using Mr. Stern’s sperm, Mrs. Whitehead would become pregnant. Mrs. Whitehead would deliver the born child to the Sterns and terminate her maternal rights so that Mrs. Stern could thereafter adopt the child. Mrs. Whitehead’s husband, Richard, was also a party to the contract; Mrs. Stern was not. Mr. Whitehead promised to do all acts necessary to rebut the presumption of paternity. The contract gave Mrs. Stern sole custody in the event of Mr. Stern’s death. Mr. Stern agreed to pay Mrs. Whitehead $10,000 after the child’s birth, on its delivery to him. He agreed to pay $7,500 to the Infertility Center of New York (ICNY), and ICNY arranged for the surrogacy contract. The history of the parties sug
gests good faith. However, almost from the moment of birth Mrs. Whitehead realized she could not part with the child. She nonetheless turned her child over to the Sterns on March 30 at the Whiteheads’ home. Later that evening Mrs. Whitehead was stricken with unbearable sadness. The Sterns, concerned that she might commit suicide turned the child over to her on her word that she would return her in a week. It became apparent that Mrs. Whitehead could not return the child, and Mr. Stern filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the surrogacy contract. An order in favor of Stern was entered, and the process server, aided by police, entered Mrs. Whitehead’s home to execute the order. Mr. Whitehead fled with the child. The Whiteheads fled to Florida with Baby M. Police in Florida forcibly removed the child from her grandparent’s home and turned the child over to the Sterns. At trial, the court held that the surrogacy contract was valid, it ordered Mrs. Whitehead’s parental rights
be terminated, that sole custody be granted to Mr. Stern, and immediately entered an order allowing the adoption of Melissa by Mrs. Stern. The trial court devoted the major portion of its opinion to the question of the baby’s best interests, finding that specific performance would not be granted unless that remedy was in the best interests of the child. On the question of best interests, the Supreme Court agreed substantially with both the trial court’s analysis and conclusions. However, the Court differed in its review and analysis of the surrogacy contract.

Issue. Is the surrogacy contract enforceable, and if not, who should gain custody of Baby M?

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Brief Fact Summary. Dr. Lifchez represents a class of plaintiff physicians specializing in reproductive endocrinology and fertility counseling. Plaintiff sued the Illinois Attorney General and Cook County State’s Attorney, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Abortion Law is unconstitutional.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The challenged Law is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutionally invades a woman’s right to privacy.

Facts. Dr. Lifchez represents a class of plaintiff physicians specializing in reproductive endocrinology and fertility counseling. Plaintiff sued the Illinois Attorney General and Cook County State’s Attorney, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Abortion Law is unconstitutional.

Issue. Is the Law as written unconstitutional?

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Brief Fact Summary. A child was born by artificial insemination during a marriage. Wife and husband separated and the wife’s new husband attempted to adopt the child, claiming that the previous husband’s consent was unnecessary because he was not the parent of the child.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A child born of consensual AID during a valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage. The husband in such a relationship is therefore the parent, and his consent is required to the adoption of such child be another.

Facts. Two types of artificial insemination exist: Homologous insemination, whereby the wife is artificially impregnated with the semen of her husband (AIH); and heterologous insemination, the artificial insemination of the wife by the semen of a third-party donor (AID). AID procedures have increased due to the unavailability of adoptive children. In the present case, a child was born of consensual AID during the marriage. The husband was listed as the father on the birth certificate. The couple later separated, followed by a divorce. The separation agreement and divorce decree declare the child to be the daughter and child of the couple. The wife was granted support and the husband visitation rights. Husband faithfully visited and performed all support conditions. The wife later remarried and her husband petitioned to adopt the child. The first husband refused to consent, and petitioner suggested that the first husband’s consent was not required because he is not the parent
of the child.

Issue. Is the husband’s consent required as the parent of a child born of consensual AID?

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Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner brought a petition for visitation of the son of respondent, whom petitioner had helped to raise and care for during petitioner and respondent’s former lesbian relationship.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under New York Domestic Relations Law, petitioner has no standing to seek visitation rights as a parent.

Facts. Petitioner Alison D. and Respondent Virginia M. established a relationship together and decided to have a child together, with respondent being artificially inseminated. The planned the conception and birth together an agreed to share jointly in all rights and responsibilities of child-rearing. Respondent gave birth to a baby boy, who was given petitioner’s last name as his middle name and respondent’s last name as his last name. Petitioner shared all birthing expenses and after birth continued to provide for his support. Petitioner and respondent jointly cared for and made decisions regarding the child for his first two years. When the child was two petitioner and respondent terminated their relationship and petitioner moved out of the jointly owned house. They agreed to a visitation schedule, and petitioner also agreed to continue to pay one half of the mortgage and major household expenses. The child referred to both petitioner and respondent as mommy. Three years l
ater respondent bought out petitioner’s interest in the house and began to restrict petitioner’s visitation. The next year petitioner moved to Ireland to pursue career opportunities, but continued to try to communicate with the child. Respondent terminated all contact between petitioner and the child. No dispute exists that respondent is a fit parent. Petitioner commenced this proceeding to seek visitation rights pursuant to New York Domestic Relations Law.

Issue. Under New York Domestic Relations Law, can a nonparent seek continued visitation with a child when the nonparent has developed a relationship with a child or had prior relationships with a child’s parents?

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Brief Fact Summary. Birth and adoptive parents contracted to have continued visitation between the adopted child and the birth mother. The adoptive parents refused to abide by the agreement, and the birth mother sought specific performance.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Visitation agreements between birth and adoptive parents are enforceable so long as continued visitation is in the best interests of the child.

Facts. Groves signed a document terminating her rights to L.C. when L.C. was 3, relinquishing custody to Lutheran Social Services (LSS) and consenting to adoption. Groves and the Clarks signed a written visitation agreement providing that Groves would have unrestricted visitation so long as she gave the Clarks 2 days notice; that Groves would have unrestricted telephone contact; and that she would have the right to take L.C. out of school in the event that she had to go to Butte for some emergency. The agreement was drafted by LSS and neither party consulted an attorney before signing. In February 1994 the court terminated Groves’ parental rights and awarded custody of L.C. to LSS. In September 1994 the Clarks legally adopted L.C. Groves and the Clarks abided by the agreement until June 5, 1995, when Groves notified the Clarks that she wanted to take L.C. to Butte for the weekend and the Clarks refused. They told Groves that she was welcome to visit L.C. in their home, but coul
d not take her on extended out-of-town trips. Groves sought specific performance of the agreement, and the Clarks objected, moving for summary judgment. The court denied Groves’ petition, finding the agreement void and unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that birth and prospective adoptive parents are free to contract for visitation, and trial courts must give effect to the contracts when the continued visitation is in the best interests of the child. The Court remanded for a hearing on whether enforcement of the agreement would be in the best interests of the L.C.

Issue. Did the court err in its determination that the visitation agreement was enforceable because continued visitation was in the best interests of the child?

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Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs sought to nullify the adoption of daughter based on alleged fraudulent conduct or misrepresentations of the adoptive agency. The Family Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Family Court has jurisdiction to nullify an adoption if plaintiffs can prove their claim of fraudulent conduct or misrepresentations by clear and convincing evidence.

Facts. Plaintiffs, adoptive parents of an 8 year old daughter, complain that their adoption decree was procured by the fraudulent conduct or misrepresentations of certain representatives of the Department of Children and Their Families (DCF). Plaintiffs contend that DCF never informed them that the staff of a hospital known for treatment of the emotionally disturbed informed DCF that the 8 year old should not be placed for adoption due to her behavioral problems. The plaintiffs sought nullification of the adoption decree and compensation for expenses incurred. On order was entered denying the parents’ complaint for a lack of jurisdiction. At the court’s insistence, counsel for DCF filed a petition asking that the daughter, now a teenager, be declared a dependent child and placed in the custody of the state.

Issue. Does the Family Court have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by the plaintiffs?

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Brief Fact Summary. During a divorce proceeding plaintiff disclaimed defendant’s parentage of a child, even though he had always acted as the child’s father. The court determined that he was neither the child’s biological or equitable parent and denied requests for stepparent visitation.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Equitable parenthood is a permanent status. If a party satisfies the criteria for equitable parenthood for a reasonable period of time, a subsequent change would not alter the party’s status.

Facts. During a divorce proceeding plaintiff disclaimed defendant’s parentage of a child born during their marriage. Before this, defendant had always acted as, and believed himself to be, the father. No paternity testing has been performed, and the trial court entered the divorce judgment excluding the child as a child of the marriage. The court later determined that defendant was not the child’s biological or equitable parent and denied defendant’s requests for stepparent visitation.

Issue. Did the trial court err in finding that defendant was not an equitable parent to the child?

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Brief Fact Summary. Mother surrendered custody of her child to petitioners, as did the person mother alleged as father. Mother later recanted and admitted another father was the biological father, and this father petitioned for paternity and custody. The Iowa court granted father custody, but a Michigan court granted petitioners request to modify the custody ruling.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. If a custody determination in a state is consistent with the provisions of the UCJA and the PKPA, every State shall enforce its terms and not modify the decision.

Facts. On February 8, 1991 Cara Clausen gave birth to a baby girl. On February 10, she signed a release of custody, relinquishing her parental rights to the child, and named Scott Seefeld as the father. On February 14, he executed a release of custody. On February 25, petitioners, Michigan residents, petitioned the Iowa court to adopt the child. At hearing, the parental rights of Clausen and Seefeld were terminated, and petitioners were granted custody during the pendency of the proceeding. Petitioners returned to Michigan with the child. Nine days after filing of the adoption proceeding Clausen filed a motion to revoke her release of custody stating that she had lied when she named Seefeld as the father and that the actual father was Daniel Schmidt. Schmidt filed an affidavit of paternity seeking to intervene in the adoption proceeding initiated by petitioners. The Iowa court found that Schmidt was the biological father and that petitioners failed to establish either that he
had abandoned the child or that his rights should be terminated. It determined that the best interests of the child analysis becomes appropriate only after a showing of abandonment. The court concluded that the termination proceedings were void with respect to Schmidt, and the petitioners’ petition to adopt must be denied. Petitioners filed a petition in Michigan asking the court to assume jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCJA). They requested the court enjoin enforcement of the Iowa custody order and find it was unenforceable, or in the alternative to modify it to give custody to the petitioners. The Michigan court entered an ex parte temporary restraining order directing the child to remain in the custody of petitioners and ordered Schmidt not to remove the child. The Michigan court found it had jurisdiction to find the best interests of the child, denied Schmidt’s motion for summary judgment, and directed that the child remain with petitioners
until further order of the court.

Issue. Did the Michigan court have jurisdiction to rule on the petitioner’s claims and did petitioners have standing?