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Brief Fact Summary. Respondent attorney not only advised his client to comply with extortion demands made by a union boss, but acted as an intermediary to ensure that the payments were made.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Attorneys may not condone nor act as intermediaries for the extortion of their clients.

Facts. Respondent, attorney Frank Masters, was serving part-time as a Special Assistant Attorney General as well as operating his own law practice. A client came to him who had been repeatedly extorted, with threats of violence, by a union boss (who happened to be overseeing a construction project that Respondent’s son was working on) who was known to follow through on his threats. Respondent advised his client to comply, and arranged to deliver the payments himself. Once these actions came out in unrelated proceedings, Respondent was referred to the state bar association for disciplining?

Issue. Was the Respondent’s conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice?

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Brief Fact Summary. A white law school applicant challenges a law school’s use of race as a factor in the admissions process.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Schools may consider race as a part of the admissions process as long as it is only one factor in an individualized process.

Facts. Petitioner, Barbara Grutter, applied for admission to University of Michigan Law School in 1997 with an undergraduate GPA of 3.8 and an LSAT of 161. She was denied. Petitioner, who is white, is challenging the law school’s use of race as a factor in the admissions process.

Issue. Did the University of Michigan’s use of racial preferences in the admissions process violate the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

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Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner alleges that her failure to be promoted to partner at Defendant law firm was due to her gender, and has brought suit under Title VII. The lower court held that Title VII doesn’t apply to law partnerships; she appeals.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers in the context of any contractual employer/employee relationship, including law partnerships.

Facts. Petitioner, Elizabeth Hishon, an associate with Defendant law firm, alleges that she was twice passed up for the opportunity to become a partner at the firm, despite the fact that this privilege was granted “as a matter of course” for almost all of its other associates. She brought a Title VII claim against the firm for discrimination on the basis of sex, and the District Court concluded that Title VII did not apply to the selection of partners in a law partnership. Petitioner appeals.

Issue. Did the District Court properly dismiss Petitioner’s Title VII discrimination complaint?

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Brief Fact Summary. Defense attorney was disciplined for a public statement made at a press conference in which he maintained his client’s innocence and implicated one of the government’s witnesses as the perpetrator.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Attorneys may not make public statements that present a “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” to a fair trial.

Facts. Petitioner, attorney Dominic Gentile, was representing a defendant in a highly publicized case. In response to a wave of adverse publicity about his client, Gary Sanders, Petitioner called a press conference in which he defended his Sanders’s innocence and stated that the man who had actually “stolen the drugs and the money” was one of the investigating detectives who would be testifying as a witness for the prosecution. He also suggested that this detective was a drug user and that several of the other witnesses were known criminals. The court succeeded in empaneling a jury that it believed to be unaffected by these statements, and Sanders was acquitted of all charges. Petitioner was later disciplined by the Nevada state bar for violation of its Rule 177 prohibiting public statements that the attorney should reasonably know have a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing” legal proceedings, and now appeals.

Issue. The main issue here is not Petitioner’s statements, but the rule under which he was disciplined and its application.
May a state constitutionally prohibit attorneys from making statements to the press that they reasonably should know will have a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding”?

If so, was Petitioner’s disciplining warranted under this standard?

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Brief Fact Summary. A prominent Illinois white supremacist was denied a law license by the state board of bar examiners on the grounds that his “moral character and fitness” were not to the proper standard.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An applicant for a state law license may be determined to be deficient in “moral character and fitness” on the basis of hateful, extremist beliefs.

Facts. Respondent, Matthew Hale, was a well-known white supremacist in Illinois who headed the “World Church of the Creator.” This “church” was solely dedicated to the “survival, expansion, and advancement of the White Race [sic] exclusively” and actively preached hatred against Jews, Muslims, and nearly every other racial, religious, and ethnic group. Although it claimed to advocate non-violence, several of its members were involved in notorious hate crimes throughout its existence. Respondent attended the University of Illinois Law School and passed the Illinois bar exam in 1998. His character and fitness to serve as an attorney in Illinois was called into question by his beliefs, however, and they are examined here.

Issue. Does Respondent have the “moral character and fitness” to practice law in Illinois?

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Brief Fact Summary. Defendants’ software product, designed to assist users in filling out basic legal forms, is challenged as an unauthorized practice of law in Texas.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Software products that actively assist users in filling out simple legal forms may constitute an unauthorized practice of law.

Facts. Plaintiffs, the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee (a Texas committee formed to enforce that state’s unauthorized practice of law rules), allege that Defendant software manufacturer’s product constitutes an unauthorized practice of law under Texas law. This software, “Quicken Family Lawyer,” “interviews” users to determine which of about 100 included legal forms would be right for them for a variety of simple legal tasks such as testamentary and divorce documents. It then assists the user in filling out the appropriate forms, even going as far as to tailor the form to the law of the user’s jurisdiction.

Issue. Can the development and sale of interactive software designed to help people with generalized legal problems constitute “the unauthorized practice of law”?

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Brief Fact Summary. Defendant attorney appeals malpractice judgment on the grounds that the relevant law was so unclear at the time when he represented Plaintiff as to insulate him from any liability.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An attorney’s standard of care includes the duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of the applicable law before providing a client with his advice.

Facts. Plaintiff, Rosemary Smith, retained Defendant, attorney Jerome Lewis, to assist her in obtaining a divorce in California. Using personal knowledge rather than consulting the relevant law, Defendant advised her that her husband’s National Guard retirement benefits would not be considered “community property” in California, and did not plead them as such in the complaint filed three days later. Plaintiff was later advised that she should have included these benefits as community property, but this claim was by then time-barred. Plaintiff proceeded to bring a malpractice claim against Defendant and received $100,000 in damages after a jury trial, which Defendant now appeals.

Issue. To what extent should Defendant be held liable for possibly misinterpreting an ambiguous legal standard-using only his immediate knowledge of it-upon which reasonable attorneys in the field could disagree? Should the entire award be allowed?