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Brief Fact Summary. This case arose from two separate decisions by the Atomic Energy Commission (Commission) 1) to grant a license to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Petitioner), and 2) to grant a permit to Consumers Power Co. (Petitioner). The Natural Resources Defense Council (Respondent) challenged the Commission in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, claiming it employed insufficient procedure.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Section:553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that agencies publish notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, and that interested parties be given an opportunity to participate, or comment, before the agency adopts a final rule. This section of the APA imposes the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have courts impose upon agencies in rulemaking procedures.

Facts. In the first case, the Court remanded a decision of the Commission to grant a license to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. to operate a nuclear power plant, finding the proceedings to be inadequate and overturning the rule. In the second case, the Court remanded the Commission’s to grant a permit to Consumers Power Co. to construct two pressurized water nuclear reactors to generate electricity and steam.

Issue. Were the agency’s rulemaking procedures adequate?

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Brief Fact Summary. This case arose from two separate decisions by the Atomic Energy Commission (Commission) 1) to grant a license to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Petitioner), and 2) to grant a permit to Consumers Power Co. (Petitioner). The Natural Resources Defense Council (Respondent) challenged the Commission in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, claiming it employed insufficient procedure.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Section:553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that agencies publish notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, and that interested parties be given an opportunity to participate, or comment, before the agency adopts a final rule. This section of the APA imposes the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have courts impose upon agencies in rulemaking procedures.

Facts. In the first case, the Court remanded a decision of the Commission to grant a license to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. to operate a nuclear power plant, finding the proceedings to be inadequate and overturning the rule. In the second case, the Court remanded the Commission’s to grant a permit to Consumers Power Co. to construct two pressurized water nuclear reactors to generate electricity and steam.

Issue. Were the agency’s rulemaking procedures adequate?

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Brief Fact Summary. Frank A. Whitehead created a joint bank account with Cora Goddard and later changed the name on the account to plaintiff, Enola Stevens Franklin. Both women provided personal care for Whitehead while he was losing his eyesight. At his death, the circuit court awarded Goddard the funds in the bank account as the joint survivor.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A joint tenancy account presumptively creates a gift unless the party claiming adversely proves by clear and convincing evidence that a gift was not intended.

Facts. Whitehead and Goddard went to a bank on April 17, 1978. Goddard signed a signature card for a savings account. According to Goddard, the two went to the bank to have Whitehead’s money put in both their names so she could get money when they needed it. She claimed that Goddard wanted her to have the money if she outlived him. The signatures of Whitehead and Goddard appeared on both sides of the card. The name of Whitehead’s late wife was “whited out” on the card and Goddard’s signature was added. The back of the card stated that all funds deposited are owned by signatories as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The plaintiff began to care for Whitehead later in 1978. In January of 1979, nine months after adding Goddard’s name to the savings account, Whitehead attempted to remove Goddard’s name and substitute Franklin’s name. In a letter dated January 13, 1979, Whitehead wrote, “I Frank Whitehead want Enola Stevens and me only go in my lock box. Account type Sa
ving and Checking. In case I can’t see she is to take care of my bill or sick.” Goddard testified that she did not make any deposits or withdrawals.

Issue. Whether there is clear and convincing evidence that a gift was not intended when a joint tenancy account is created?

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Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff grandchildren contend that they should be able to maintain a lawsuit for legal malpractice against the Defendant attorney who allegedly negligently drafted a trust agreement for which they were beneficiaries.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Intended beneficiaries of a will or trust will be denied a cause of action for legal malpractice against the attorney retained by the testator as there is no professional duty of care owed to such persons.

Facts. Frances Barcelo retained Defendant, David Elliot, to assist her with estate planning. Defendant drafted a will and inter vivos trust agreement for her. Barcelo signed the will and trust agreement in September 1990 and passed away in January 1991. Two of Barcelo’s children contested the validity of the trust and it was declared invalid and unenforceable. Plaintiffs, Barcelo’s grandchildren, who were the intended remainder beneficiaries under the trust, settled for an amount substantially smaller than they would have received under the trust. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a malpractice action against the Defendant alleging his negligence caused the trust to be invalid. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs now appeal.

Issue. Whether an attorney who negligently drafts a will or trust agreement owes a duty of care to person intended to benefit under the will or trust, even though the attorney never represented the intended beneficiaries?

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Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff contends that he is the owner of a painting gifted to him by his father, prior to his father’s death, even though his father retained possession of the painting.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order to have a valid inter vivos gift one must show an intent of the part of the donor to make a present transfer, delivery of the gift, and acceptance by the donee. A present transfer may include the creation of a remainder in chattel.

Facts. Plaintiff’s father wrote a letter to the Plaintiff on his birthday stating that he was giving his son a Klimit painting but that he wished to retain possession of the painting for his lifetime. Plaintiff was later instructed to destroy this letter in two subsequent letters sent by his father. One of the subsequent letters provided that Plaintiff was to be given the painting and made no mention of his father’s retention of a life estate. Plaintiff never took possession of the painting during his father’s lifetime. Following his father’s death Plaintiff requested the Klimit painting from his step mother, Defendant, and she refused. Plaintiff then brought this cause of action.

Issue. Whether a valid inter vivos gift of chattel may be made where the donor has reserved a life estate in the chattel and the donee never had physical possession of it before the donor’s death?

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Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner, George Benjamin Ford, Jr. asserts that Respondent, Pearl Rose Ford is not entitled to obtain property under their mother’s will even though she was insane at the time she murdered her mother.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The “slayer’s rule”, which prevents an individual who commits a felonious and intentional homicide from sharing in the distribution of the decedent’s estate, is not applicable when the killer was not criminally responsible for their conduct at the time they committed the homicide.

Facts. Respondent murdered her mother by stabbing her 40 times. Under the criminal law she was found guilt of murder in the first degree, however she was also found not criminally responsible by reason of insanity. The trial court in which the will was admitted to probate ruled that Petitioner be declared the heir of the estate. On appeal the Circuit Court reversed and decided that Respondent was entitled to the property. Petitioner now appeals.

Issue. Can an individual who kills another share in the distribution of the decedent’s estate when the individual was insane at the time of the killing?

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Brief Fact Summary. Appellant brought suit against her father’s attorney alleging breach of fiduciary duty for his failure to disclose the existence of a second will executed by her father.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A fiduciary relationship exists when one has a special confidence in another so that the latter, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith.

Facts. On October 24, 1984, Dobson, Respondent, a South Carolina Lawyer, drafted decedent’s will. Decedent had a daughter, Judy, and a son, Tommy. Decedent owned two automobile dealerships, the Greenville Dealership and the Anderson Dealership. In decedent’s first will he left the Greenville Dealership to his son, gave other family members bequests totaling $250,000, and divided the remainder of his estate equally between his son and a trust for his daughter, Appellant. The same afternoon that decedent executed his first will, he returned to respondent’s office and signed a second will containing the same provisions as the first will except that it gave real estate upon which the Greenville Dealership was located to Tommy outright. Decedent instructed respondent not to disclose the existence of the second will and specifically directed that Appellant not be told about it. In January 1985, appellant called respondent requesting a copy of the will her father had signed the morn
ing of October 24, 1984 and with decedent’s permission, respondent discussed the first will with appellant in detail. Respondent explained decedent’s intent to provide for appellant as he had for his son when and if she became capable of handling a dealership and respondent made notations to this effect on the copy of the will he discussed with appellant. Appellant claims respondent told her the will she was shown was in actuality decedents last will and testament and appellant believed the handwritten notes were part of the will. Respondent denies making that express statement but admits that he never told her the will he discussed with appellant had been revoked. In January 1986 decedent was admitted to the hospital for various health problems and while decedent was ill, appellant and her brother decided appellant would care for decedent while he temporarily ran the Anderson Dealership. Appellant questioned her brother’s financial dealing while he was running the Anderson Deale
rship and consulted an Anderson law firm regarding her concerns. Respondent was granted summary judgment on the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Appellant appeals.

Issue. Whether the decedent’s attorney breached his fiduciary duty to Appellant by following decedent’s wishes and not disclosing the existence of a second will to Appellant?

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Brief Fact Summary. Action was brought by Plaintiff for a declaratory judgment and the construction of the will of his father, David Shapira, testator.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A gift conditioned upon the beneficiary marrying within a particular religious class or faith is reasonable.

Facts. David Shapira, M.D., testator, conditioned his son, Daniel Jacob Shapira, Plaintiff, inheritance under his will upon Plaintiff being married to, or marrying within seven years of testator’s death, a Jewish girl with two Jewish parents. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that such a condition was unconstitutional based upon the premise that the right to marry is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Issue. Whether a condition upon inheritance, which is based on marriage, is unconstitutional, contrary to public policy, and unenforceable because of its unreasonableness?

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Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff sued Defendant for trespass on the case in federal court in North Carolina. Judgment was found for Defendant. Plaintiff appealed arguing the federal court lacked jurisdiction.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A judgment rendered by a court created pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution is ineffective unless said court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Facts. Capron (Plaintiff) sued Van Noorden (Defendant) for trespass on the case in federal court in North Carolina. The lower court found for Defendant. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that neither party nor the court alleged any facts that would give the court jurisdiction over the case.

Issue. In cases brought in courts created pursuant to Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, is judgment rendered in said court effective if there is no clear statement alleging subject matter jurisdiction?

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Brief Fact Summary. A police commissioner was fired after a dispute with city officials.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not extend immunity to municipalities and their officials.

Facts. “Owen, police commissioner of Independence, was fired after an acrimonious dispute over administration of the police department. Alleging that the dismissal violated due process and seeking damages, he sued the City and, in their official capacities, the City Manager and the City Council.”

Issue. Whether the city of Independence, Mo, “is entitled to qualified immunity from liability.”